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Concerted Action on the Periphery? 
Voluntary Economic Planning in 
"The New Nova Scotia" 
"Voluntary economic planning is a new concept that can boost our 
economic development if we have the co-operation of all the people of 
Nova Scotia..." 
- Hon. Robert L. Stanfield 
"There is a need to study the plans and the prospects of our main 
industries and to encourage faster and more sustained economic growth..." 
- Hon. G. I. Smith 
THESE TWO STATEMENTS FORMED A PREFACE to most major public documents 
released by the Voluntary Economic Planning (VEP) organization during the early 
1960s, i They were usually accompanied by a pictorial design showing a map of 
Nova Scotia overlaid on graph paper, with a steadily rising trend line transecting 
the length of the province. These were the hallmarks of the organization which was 
established to bring comprehensive economic planning to a small Maritime 
province. Established over 30 years ago, VEP was designed as an economic 
planning apparatus based on business-labour-government consultation. Of 
particular interest here are the first eight years of VEP activities (1962-1970), when 
the commitment to a notion of planning remained vital. An examination of VEP 
during its formative period raises some intriguing analytical questions. Why did it 
appear in a small hinterland province, and to what end? What level of performance 
was achieved? Finally, what does this reveal about the prospects for 
provincially-based economic planning? 
To be sure, Nova Scotia was not unique in this experience. Collectively, the 
Canadian provinces have presided over an array of "development plans" since 
1960. Some of these were sub-regional, as with Quebec's BAEQ project in the 
Gaspé, New Brunswick's Northeast and Mactaquac projects, Ontario's regional 
economic plans, and the northern programmes developed in Saskatchewan and 
1 Work on this project has been supported financially by the University Council for Research, 
St. Francis Xavier University. Mr. Allan Murray and Ms. Carolyn Chishom made 
indispensable contributions as my Research Assistants. I would also like to thank Mr. Tom 
Webb, Director of the Extension Department, St. Francis Xavier University, for permission to 
examine the papers of Rev. J.N. MacNeil. 
Peter Clancy, "Concerted Action on the Periphery? Voluntary Economic Planning 
in 'The New Nova Scotia'", Acadiensis, XXVI, 2 (Spring 1997), pp. 3-30. 
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Manitoba.2 Others were more comprehensive in scope, as in the case of 
Newfoundland's Rural Resettlement Program, and the P.E.I. Plan. Many, though 
not all, of these plans were collaborative efforts with the federal authority. 
Less common were initiatives at the strictly provincial level, which aimed to 
involve producer groups in the formulation of a broad scale economic strategy. 
Again Quebec played a pioneering role, beginning in 1961 when Jean Lesage 
created the Conseil d'orientation économique du Quebec (COEQ). Manitoba also 
mounted an extensive set of consultations under the Roblin administration, first 
through the Committee on Manitoba's Economic Future (COMEF) and later with 
the Targets for Economic Development (TED) Committee.3 Nova Scotia's 
Voluntary Economic Planning apparatus was part of this opening wave of 
provincial experiments, looking beyond the familiar administrative and 
inter-governmental structures, seeking to plan in concert with organized economic 
interests. 
By design, Voluntary Economic Planning was an effort at institutionalized 
consultation, aimed at creating or enhancing the links between capital (and to a 
lesser extent labour) and the state. That this occurred in a peripheral province, 
subject to all of the limitations which a federal structure can impose, makes it an 
interesting test of the prospects for joint planning in Canada. Despite its lofty 
ambitions, VEP failed in its planning function, though it succeeded in carving out 
a durable role at the consultative level. By the end of the first decade, the 
government's political commitment to concerted planning was exhausted. While it 
continues to function today, Voluntary Planning (as it is now designated) has long 
since abandoned the mandate of its youth. Instead, it serves as a formalized 
conduit for interest group liaison with government officials.4 
With Voluntary Economic Planning, the Stanfield Government sought to attack 
several inhibiting features of provincial economic policy-making. If accelerated 
growth, income and employment were to be achieved, then a restructured state 
would be necessary to mount a new form of interventionist strategy. In the 
terminology of recent analytic debates about "weak" and "strong" state forms, 
Voluntary Economic Planning constituted a potential instrument for realizing 
2 G. Weiler, "Managing Canada's North: The Case of the Provincial North", Canadian Public 
Administration, 27, 2 (Summer 1984), pp. 197-209; Jacques Benjamin, Planification et 
Politiques au Québec (Montréal, 1974); Robert Young, "L'Édification de l'état provincial et le 
développement régional au Nouveau-Brunswick", Égalité, 13-14 (automne 1984-L'Hiver 
1985), pp. 125-52; John Loxley, "The 'Great Northern' Plan", Studies in Political Economy, 6 
(1981), pp. 151-82; Murray Dobbin, "Prairie Colonialism", Studies in Political Economy, 10 
(1985),pp.7-40. 
3 Manitoba, 1962-1975, Report of the Commission on Manitoba's Economic Future (Winnipeg, 
1963); Manitoba to 1980, Report of the Commission on Targets for Economic Development 
(Winnipeg, 1969). 
4 One account of the later period can be found in the official history of the organization. See 
Anthony Lamport, Common Ground (Halifax, 1988). For a discussion of the transition of 
1970, see also A. Paul Pross, The Statutory Basis of Provincial and Municipal Planning in 
Nova Scotia: A Review (Halifax, 1974), pp. 35-9. 
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certain strong state capabilities^ These include greater autonomy, and central co-
ordination, of executive institutions in order to harness policy effort toward 
ambitious development goals. At the same time, however, the new experiment 
departed from another hallmark feature of strong state politics, a capacity to 
insulate key policy processes from the constraints often imposed by organized 
interests. In fact, the Voluntary Economic Planning structure invited and even 
extended the mobilization of business and labour in the planning exercise. While 
this may have signified a shrewd appreciation of the political risks entailed in a 
planning experiment, and a determination to secure support among resident 
economic stakeholders, it also invited risks to coherent and consistent action. There 
is a danger in approaching these questions in overly schematic ways, of course, 
especially since political practice often copes with high degrees of contradiction. 
Either the support of a politically assertive business segment, or a deadlock among 
multiple segments, may provide autonomy under circumstances of high interest 
mobilization. However, the strong state notion underlines the heavy weight that 
VEP was expected to bear: in overcoming fragmented executive decision-making, in 
formalizing interest representation beyond the conventional advocacy channels, and 
in generating substantive information and planning proposals. 
The urge to plan was not totally new to the Province of Nova Scotia, though it 
had never been attempted on such a global and systematic basis. Two provincial 
Royal Commissions, the Jones Economic Inquiry (1934) and the Dawson 
Commission on Provincial Development and Rehabilitation (1944), had surveyed 
the growth potential of the economy as a whole, generating policy prescriptions in 
the process.6 They both made cases for greater government responsibility in the 
economy, though they could do little to control the political and administrative 
follow-up. However incisive the analysis, they offered policy snapshots taken 
through the lens of the investigating commissioner. It was much later, in a 1955 
Report to the Department of Trade and Industry, that the prospect of ongoing 
private-public sector consultation was raised. Arthur D. Little consultants had been 
hired to advise on promising sectors for industrial recruitment and expansion. They 
proposed an industrial consultative committee, to furnish the province "a 
systematic means of conveying the direction of its policy to the public, private 
industry and labor representatives ... [as well as] .. a source of private industrial 
opinion in preliminary consideration of policies and projects prior to their 
negotiation and implementation".? While the Little report addressed the industry 
programme alone, the principle of routinized consultation would serve later as a 
cornerstone of VEP. 
During the Stanfield era, the urge for co-ordinated provincial planning was 
5 For a helpful discussion of the concepts of weak and strong states as applied to Canada, see 
Michael M. Atkinson and William D. Coleman, The State, Business and Industrial Change in 
Canada (Toronto, 1989), chap. 3. 
6 Nova Scotia, Royal Commission of Provincial Economic Inquiry, Report (Halifax, 1934); 
Royal Commission on Provincial Development and Rehabilitation, Report (Halifax, 1944). 
7 Arthur D. Little, Inc. Industrial Development in Nova Scotia, Report to the Department of 
Trade and Industry, March 18, 1955, p. 76. 
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combined with the impulse for industrial consultation. First elected in 1956, the 
Stanfield government built its campaign platform around the need to reverse the 
province's relative economic decline in the post-war years. Once in power, the 
government looked outward for appropriate models and policy vehicles. 
Management consultants (like A.D. Little) were engaged to assess the organization 
of the provincial civil service. New perspectives were developed for federal-
provincial fiscal negotiations. Of greatest importance, however, were three quite 
novel economic policy instruments which were adopted from Europe. To attract new 
manufacturing enterprise to Nova Scotia, the province borrowed the model of North 
Eastern Trading Estates, a publicly funded agency furnishing industrial parks to 
northeast England. In 1957, legislation was enacted to establish Nova Scotia 
Industrial Estates Ltd. (IEL).s Five years later, the McKinnon judicial inquiry into 
industrial relations was impressed by the Swedish labour market planning system. 
Out of this grew Nova Scotia's Joint Labour-Management Study Committee 
(JLMSC), in the hope of promoting partnership relations between unions and 
employers.9 Finally, the province looked abroad for an economic planning model, 
which it found in the indicative planning system then flourishing in France. The 
genealogy of VEP is discussed in greater detail below. For the moment it is worth 
noting that together these mechanisms formalized the provincial state's interest in 
three crucial class relationships: with large scale external capital (IEL), with 
resident capital large and small (VEP), and with resident capital and labour 
(JLMSC). 
Underpinning this impulse to experiment was the spectre of economic decline. 
While productive output and employment both grew in absolute terms during the 
1950s, Nova Scotia's performance was poor in relation to the national Canadian 
average. Moreover, the per capita differential in incomes between province and 
nation was not narrowing. Robert Stanfield captured the dilemma pointedly: 
We felt we had to run very hard just to stand still. In agriculture we had a 
system of small farms, which people were constantly leaving. Fishing was 
in a state of revolution. The so-called inshore fisherman was pretty well 
disappearing in most parts of the province. That involved a large 
expansion in the trawler fishing industry and the centralization at certain 
points. The forest industry had to be re-organized substantially.The coal 
mining industry was fading rapidly. io 
8 For further details on the formation of I.E.L., see Roy E. George, The Life and Times of 
Industrial Estates Limited (Halifax, 1974); and Harry Bruce, Frank Sobey (Halifax, 1985), 
chap. 9. 
9 For details on the origins of the JLMSC, see C.H.J. Gilson and A.M. Wadden, "The Windsor 
Gypsum Strike and the Formation of the Joint Labour/Management Study Committee: 
Conflict and Accommodation in the Nova Scotia Labour Movement, 1957-1979", in Michael 
Earle, ed., Workers and the State in Twentieth Century Nova Scotia (Fredericton, 1989), 
pp. 190-216. 
10 Geoffrey Stevens, Stanfield (Toronto, 1973), p. 125. 
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This made the case for sectoral economic planning even more powerful, as a means 
to break what were seen as deeply ingrained structural tendencies. There was 
another sense in which comprehensive planning was viewed as a prerequisite for 
economic advance. From the outset, the Stanfield government had joined forces 
with other Maritime provinces in pressing Ottawa for major new economic 
initiatives in the region, n If the provinces were to have significant control over the 
disposition of such funds, it would be advantageous to have formulated in advance 
a comprehensive strategy, into which federal initiatives could fit. In explaining the 
background to voluntary planning, Nova Scotia officials sometimes referred to the 
indispensability of European (particularly French) state planning in allocating 
Marshall Plan assistance after the war. 12 In many respects the prospect of regional 
funds from Ottawa must have been viewed in a similar light to Marshall aid. 
The planning ethic was spurred further by policy currents on the national stage. 
One of these concerned industrial productivity, and particularly the fear that 
Canadian enterprise was lagging behind business in other advanced capitalist 
states. This issue had been addressed in the Final Report of the Gordon Royal 
Commission on Canada's Economic Prospects, and was being widely publicized in 
the press. Whether the problem lay chiefly in rising labour costs, in protectionist 
trade policy, or in defective entrepreneurship, the suggestion was increasingly 
common that only through joint business, labour and government consultation 
could a consensual solution be fashioned. For the Atlantic region, an added concern 
was the potentially perverse incidence of national fiscal and monetary policies, 
whose focus on meeting either inflation or recession in central Canada could be 
highly disruptive elsewhere. 
Early in 1961 the Diefenbaker Government announced the creation of a National 
Productivity Council (NPC) as a continuing conduit to private sector opinion. 
Described by Waldie as "the first fully fledged attempt in Canada (other than in 
wartime) to co-ordinate business, government and labour in the pursuit of national 
objectives",!3 its two dozen members included equal numbers of industry, labour, 
resource sector and federal government representatives. The lone Nova Scotia 
member was A.R. Harrington, then General Manager of the Nova Scotia Light and 
Power Company. 14 In 1961, the consultative council seemed to be an idea whose 
time had come. NPC Chairman George De Young stressed the need for co-operation 
11 For an account of the so-called "Atlantic Revolution" pursued by Hugh John Flemming, Joey 
Smallwood and Robert Stanfield, see Margaret Conrad, "The 1950s: the Decade of 
Development", in E.R. Forbes and D.A. Muise, eds., The Atlantic Provinces in Confederation 
(Toronto, 1993), pp. 401-13. 
12 See, for example, the presentations by Dr. W.Y. Smith and Dr. F.W. Walsh, in "A Complete 
Account of the Meeting to Form the Agricultural Sector of the Voluntary Economic Planning 
Program", 11 December 1962, pp. 15-17. 
13 K.G. Waldie, "The Evolution of Labour-Government Consultation on Economic Policy", in 
W. Craig Riddell, ed., Labour-Management Co-operation in Canada (Toronto, 1986), p. 159. 
14 "25 named to Productivity Council to Study Ills of Canadian Industry", The Chronicle-Herald 
(Halifax), 1 March 1961, p. 1. 
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if industrial goals were to be defined and achieved. 15 Editorialists gave positive 
endorsement to this "European model" of economic co-operation. 16 Even the 
President of the Canadian Chamber of Commerce predicted that business-labour 
consultation could help to moderate union wage demands and thereby lower 
production costs, n By the end of the year the NPC was promoting provincial and 
regional councils to stimulate productivity improvements on a wider front.is To 
gain greater first hand knowledge of European planning practices, the Council sent 
a delegation on a three week tour of six western European capitals during the 
summer of 1962.19 
Among all the provinces, this federal experiment had its greatest impact on 
Nova Scotia. Harrington had suggested the idea of a provincial council to Premier 
Stanfield, and received a favourable response, provided that Harrington agreed to 
assume its leadership.20 However, the Government of Nova Scotia soon decided to 
push the concept much further. In March of 1962 Stanfield told the Legislature that 
"the Provincial Government plans to introduce an economic planning method used 
successfully in France, in an effort to boost Nova Scotia's industrial economy, 
particularly in basic industries". 21 To this end, the Department of the Provincial 
Treasurer was re-designated the Department of Finance and Economics. It was 
named the province's lead agency for harnessing both governmental and non-
governmental bodies "with a view to formulating plans to create, assist, develop 
and maintain productive employment, and to develop the human and material 
resources of Nova Scotia".22 
It fell to the new Minister of Finance and Economics, G.I. (Ike) Smith, to flesh 
out this mandate, and he devised Voluntary Economic Planning as its centrepiece. 
Together with the deputy-ministers of Trade and Industry, and Finance and 
Economics, Smith mounted his own tour of Britain and France during the summer 
of 1962. This was the time when France's Third four-year Plan (1958-61) had 
drawn to a close, and the Fourth Plan (1962-65) was ready for application. Thus 
Smith encountered the French planning process at its moment of peak prestige. 
Improvements in technique, in ideological acceptance and in political leverage had 
been made during the previous cycle, while the era of bureaucratic gridlock lay in 
15 "More Co-operation in Industry Required", The Chronicle-Herald, 17 March 1961, p. 23. 
16 "Government, Management, Labour Must Pull Together", The Chronicle-Herald, 1 April 
1961, p. 1. 
17 "Canadian Economy Getting Searching Reappraisal", The Chronicle-Herald, 26 July 1961, p. 
3. 
18 "Economic Realities Must Be Faced - or Canada's in for Some Rough Shock Treatment", The 
Chronicle-Herald, 18 December 1961, p. 28. 
19 Report of the Labour-Management-Government Mission to Europe to the National Productivity 
Council (London, 1962). 
20 "Confidence Important", The Chronicle-Herald, 12 April 1962, p. 3. 
21 "N.S. Government to Create New Department of Finance", The Chronicle-Herald, 6 March 
1962, p. 1. 
22 "Provincial Finance Act", Statutes of Nova Scotia (1962), Vol. 1, Chapter 12 . 
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the future.23 Perhaps it was the grand concept which appealed to Smith more than 
the operating details. One member of the tour recalled that they arrived in France 
during August, and since virtually all government officials were absent on the 
month-long vacation, they were able to learn little about the mechanics of the 
planning system.24 
Nevertheless, Ike Smith returned home with his prototype in hand and his 
enthusiasm undiminished. Indeed, it is probable that the seeds of this initiative had 
been sown already by Professor W.Y. Smith, a University of New Brunswick 
economist who was also serving as President of the Atlantic Provinces Economic 
Council, and as an advisor to New Brunswick Premier Robichaud. Professor Smith 
had spent a sabbatical leave in England in 1960-61, where he had become an 
enthusiastic advocate of planned regional development as found in Britain and 
France.25 In the autumn of 1962 he was formally engaged as an economic 
consultant to the Department of Finance and Economics, where he played an 
important staff role for several years.26 
The concept of Voluntary Economic Planning was outlined publicly for the first 
time during the summer of 1962. Ike Smith described the European planning 
experiences as a middle way, offering advantages over laissez-faire policies on the 
one hand and wholesale social ownership on the other: 
There is a need to study centrally the potential, the plans, and the 
prospects of our main industries, to correlate them with each other and 
with the government's plans for the public sector, and to see how in 
aggregate they contribute to and fit in with the prospects for the economy 
as a whole. There is a need to encourage faster and more sustained 
economic growth, and to create and keep the best possible climate for it.27 
Voluntary Economic Planning would anchor this initiative. It was charged with the 
preparation of an economic plan for the province, based on the advice of Nova 
Scotians active in economic life. This would be fashioned into a coherent strategy 
for action. It was the consultative aspect which distinguished Voluntary Economic 
Planning from other advisory bodies which were springing up during this period. At 
its peak, more than 700 private sector "volunteers" were active within the VEP 
committee structure and more than 1300 had attended VEP organizing meetings. 
23 The literature on French planning is extensive. Some informative studies include: Stephen S. 
Cohen, Modern Capitalist Planning: The French Model (London, 1969); J. Hayward, Private 
Interests and Public Policy (New York, 1966); and Richard F. Kuisel, Capitalism and the 
State in Modern France (Cambridge, 1981). 
24 John R. Bigelow, Transcript of Interview with Dr. Anders Sandberg, 1993. I am grateful to 
Mr. Bigelow and Dr. Sandberg for this information. 
25 "Canada Lacks Economic Program Says APEC Head", The Chronicle-Herald, 22 August 
1962, p.13. 
26 "Prof. W.Y. Smith N.S. Government Economic Advisor", The Chronicle-Herald, 24 
September 1962, p. 16; "Another Smith", The Chronicle-Herald, 25 September 1962, p. 4. 
27 Hon. G.I. Smith, Speech to the Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities (August, 1962), p. 17. 
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During the fall of 1962 the actual shape of the organization began to emerge. 
The Government announced that the agricultural sector would be the first to be 
organized for planning, beginning with an "industry-wide conference" in Truro in 
December.28 This set the pattern for the subsequent organization of nine additional 
sectors. After comments by Premier Stanfield, Finance Minister G.I. Smith, 
Agriculture Minister Haliburton and Dr. W.Y. Smith, the 150 delegates spent the 
balance of the day meeting in specialized sub-groups, discussing conditions in the 
livestock, dairy, poultry, horticulture and field crop segments. By this rather open 
ended process, an initial core of activists was recruited for a set of ongoing 
"segment committees" in Agriculture. More members were added over time as the 
working groups took root. It was several months later, in April 1963, that the 
overall Agriculture Sector committee was announced, to oversee planning in this 
field. This time the members were recruited by invitation of Finance Minister Smith 
and appointed by government order. This Agriculture Sector Committee included 
the Chairs of all segment committees, along with several provincial government 
officials from the relevant agencies, and an additional set of private sector figures 
not already involved in the segments. 
By early 1963, the first VEP staff were being hired and the organization was 
given a legislative basis in the Voluntary Planning Act. 29 The statute charged the 
VEP Board with advising the Finance Minister on policy measures for economic 
growth, by coordinating sector plans and advancing an overall economic plan to 
the Government. 30 This put far greater stress on the ethics of voluntarism than on 
the exigencies of planning. As Pross pointed out, by the terms of the Act, "[the 
Board] has no coercive power; it is not authorized to use financial persuasion; and 
it has no claim to coordinate those activities of the public sectors which affect the 
performance of private economic concerns".3i 
Additional sectors were organized throughout the year, beginning with 
"Truro-type meetings" for the recruitment of segment personnel and extending to 
sectoral levels thereafter. In this way the Forestry, Fisheries and Power sectors came 
into being. It was only at the close of 1963 that the most senior body, the 
Voluntary Economic Planning Board, was convened. Again, membership was by 
invitation of the Government. Its role was to co-ordinate sector activities, review 
sector recommendations and serve as the official link between the planning 
apparatus and the provincial Cabinet. 32 
The overall design is captured by the formal organization chart presented in 
Table One. The most specialized matters were considered at the base level, where 
28 "Committee Will Study Agriculture", The Chronicle-Herald, 2 October 1962, p. 16; "Initiate 
Economic Planning Program Dec.9 - Smith", The Chronicle-Herald, 3 November 1962, p. 5; 
"Vital Task", The Chronicle-Herald, 22 November 1962, p. 4. 
29 "Economic Planning Director Chosen", The Chronicle-Herald, 27 February 1963, p. 1. 
30 Voluntary Planning Act, Revised Statutes of Nova Scotia (1967), c.332. 
31 Pross, The Statutory Basis of Provincial and Municipal Planning, p. 36. 
32 A number of VEP publications outlined the intended structure. For one, see Nova Scotia, 
Department of Finance and Economics, Voluntary Planning Board, The Organization for 
Voluntary Economic Planning (1963). 
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dozens of Segment Committees were defined by reference to major product groups. 
In size, these committees ranged from six to 20 or more members. Here a consensus 
was hammered out through discussion of grievances and demands by the committee 
members on the ground. The results were channelled upward to the Sector 
Committees, whose jurisdictions coincided with the shared concerns of major 
industry groups. Not only could the differences between Segment Committees be 
reconciled here, but common themes could be extracted and promoted by the more 
diverse membership at the sectoral level. In size, Sector Committees ranged from 18 
to 30 members. Moreover, the sector was intended to serve as the basic unit in the 
planning process, with each committee charged with the task of preparing a sector 
plan. 
Sitting astride this entire structure was the VEP Board, a carefully selected 
group of two dozen Nova Scotians. A.R. Harrington was appointed as its Chair, 
while Joe Gannon, the President of the Halifax District Labour Council (and past 
President of the N.S. Federation of Labour), was designated Vice-Chair.33 
Significantly, both Harrington and Gannon had experience sitting on the Joint 
Labour-Management Study Committee, the consultative body which predated VEP 
and was later affiliated formally with VEP.34 Though the Board included the 
Chairs of all Sector Committees, the majority consisted of members at large who 
were not involved on the lower committee levels. It is also revealing that, despite 
the VEP logo's subtitle, "Business-Labour-Government", the Board membership 
was overwhelmingly tilted toward private business representation. Only four of the 
23 inaugural members came from the labour movement, while four more were 
senior government officials. It was the Board's job to consider all sector reports and 
recommendations, which became formal VEP policy positions if approved. They 
were then transmitted to the provincial Cabinet for government action. To the 
extent that this process actually took hold, planning would, indeed, be a 
"bottom-up" phenomenon. 35 
The flip side of VEP operations, again as officially set out, consisted of a more 
traditional hierarchical process. By providing direction to the organization, as well 
as formulating an overall framework for the plan, the Board was expected to play a 
key leadership role. Following its inaugural meeting, the Board established an 
Executive Committee consisting of six members. This group exercised "executive" 
responsibilities in every sense of the word: co-ordinating staff work, setting agendas 
for Board meetings and presenting draft decisions for the Board's consideration. 
Another key element was the VEP staff group. Its Executive Director, Roger Mills, 
33 Both Harrington and Gannon were key leadership figures within their spheres. Harrington in 
particular was closely linked to the political establishment. In addition to his position on the 
federal NPC, he was a management representative on the N.S. Labour Relations Board, a 
founding management member of the JLMSC, and (subsequently) a Board member of the 
Atlantic Provinces Economic Council. 
34 In January 1963 it was announced that the JLMSC would serve as the industrial relations 
forum for VEP. In the fall of 1965 it was re-named the Industrial Relations Advisory Council. 
35 This aspect predominates in the account by J.R. Mills, "Voluntary Economic Planning in 
Nova Scotia", Canadian Public Administration, 8, 2 (1965), pp. 160-65. 
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was a professional engineer whose previous position had been Vice-President of 
Foundation Maritime Ltd. in Halifax. For several years the staff complement was 
limited to a half dozen planning officers (many of whose training was also in 
engineering, or related sciences) with modest secretarial support. However, the staff 
was frequently augmented by contract consultants and short-term secondments from 
economic agencies. 
It fell to the Board and staff to establish the parameters of the planning process. 
To facilitate consistency in the sector contributions to the overall plan, the Board 
defined a set of aggregate targets for provincial economic performance. These were, 
of necessity, quite general. However, they were intended to convey a sense of 
priorities which the segment and sector groups could translate into concrete choices, 
or at least use to guide their deliberations. In addition to establishing a common 
frame of reference, the indicative targets provided a standard, however nebulus, for 
arbitrating among conflicting proposals. 
During the early years (1963-1964) both the "bottom-up" and the "top-down" 
decision-making patterns acquired their own momentum, although the 
contradictions between the two were slow to surface. In part, the problem was one 
of timing. Since the first four sectors were activated before the Board began 
functioning, much of the early committee work was ad hoc and spontaneous. For 
example, the Forestry sector had held 27 meetings before the advent of the Board. 
The agendas for the initial Board meetings were heavy with recommendations from 
Agriculture, Forestry and Power. The segment committees were also quite free to set 
their own courses. Not yet bound by the formal planning regimen, segment 
meetings searched for agreement on the evident obstacles to growth. Where 
members reached a consensus, recommendations for action went forward to their 
Sectors. Often this worked best where segments corresponded to tight product 
groups, particularly those with an organized tradition. A strong case in point was 
agriculture, where the high level of prior organization in farmer and processor 
associations, as well as on marketing boards, facilitated the progress up the 
learning curve.36 The Forestry Sector experienced a similar ease of operation, 
initially. Here the members of the pulp and paper products segment were drawn 
mainly from the pulp and paper industry, which was densely organized at the 
national level through the various layers of the Canadian Pulp and Paper 
Association and the Canadian Institute of Forestry. Similarly the lumber and sawn 
products segment coincided closely with the sawmillers' provincial trade group, the 
Nova Scotia Forest Products Association. 
Consequently, it is not surprising that the pulp segment generated a clutch of 
motions during its inaugural year of 1963. These ranged from a call for a 
comprehensive new forest inventory, to studies on the reform of forest taxation, and 
36 G.I. Smith commented on this at the Organizational Meeting: "those concerned with 
agriculture have had a long experience with the necessity of planning in one form or another". 
A Complete Account, p. 6. 
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improved forest product transportations All found ready support at the Sector level 
and were duly passed on to the Board where, again, they were favourably received. 
However, as time passed, the potential contradictions among segment proposals 
began to emerge. In 1964 the lumber segment called for a study of greater 
utilization of sawmill residues by pulp processors, and later still called for crown 
forest lands to be offered to sawmillers on the same basis as to pulp licensees. 
Given their obvious potential to pit industry segments against one another, these 
proposals were problematic for the Forest Sector. Indeed, by the fall of 1964, it 
seems that "the forest sector came to an impass [sic] because of a difference of 
opinion between those in the pulp and paper industry and those in the lumber 
industry".38 In still other cases, motions were passed through from the Sector only 
to be turned back at the Board level, normally on grounds of insufficient rationale 
or lack of jurisdiction. This was the fate of proposals to provide financial 
assistance to the NSFPA, and to divide the Ministry of Lands and Forests.39 
As a group, the "early" sectors contrasted sharply with those created later, after 
the Board had launched its planning initiative in the fall of 1964. Whereas the 
early sectors had little difficulty defining issue areas and making recommendations 
for action, with little dependence on the VEP staff, the later sectors were markedly 
less dynamic and were driven more clearly by staff research. By this point, there 
was a rush to establish a plethora of working bodies at all levels. But, more 
importantly, the later sectors (including secondary manufacturing, transportation 
and communications, tourism and services) were formed against a backdrop of 
minimal experience with organized business consultation, much less economic 
planning. In general terms, it proved easier to establish committees in the primary 
resource industries than in manufacturing, while the service sectors proved most 
difficult of all. 
The experience of the Manufacturing Sector illustrates some of the difficulties 
faced in constituting working groups in the broadly defined sectors which possessed 
little prior associational infrastructure. At the initial organizational meeting in 
December of 1963, G.I. Smith observed that "There is a need ... for better 
organization of industry itself. The Canadian Manufacturing Association and the 
recently formed association of those interested in textiles are about the only 
organized management groups concerned with secondary manufacturing".40 The 
secret continued to elude VEP as well. After an initial flurry of activity, the 
Manufacturing Sector faded and had to be re-launched in 1965. Subsequently, the 
principle of specialized manufacturing segments gave way to a design for 
geographic committees, but with no better success. Ultimately, most of the work on 
37 Rev. J.N. MacNeil Papers, RG 303/19/pp. 1381-1567, St. Francis Xavier University Archives 
[StFXUA]. 
38 Memorandum, R. Mills to VEP Board members, 8 January 1965, RG 303/19/1345, StFXUA. 
39 VEP Board, Minutes, Meeting of 27 October 1964, MacNeil Papers, RG 303/19/1746, 
StFXUA. 
40 Text of Speech by the Hon. G.I. Smith at the Organization Meeting for the Manufacturing 
Sector, December 6, 1963, p. 14. 
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secondary manufacturing was done by VEP staff and consultants. 
The Transportation and Communication Sector offers a further case in point. As 
the ninth to be launched, it did not hold an organizational meeting until the spring 
of 1965, and its members were not appointed until June ofthat year. In fact, rather 
than holding a "Truro-type meeting", the Board engaged Dr. J.J. Vorstermans of 
Saint Mary's University to write the draft document which formed the basis of the 
discussions. While a late start may have left the Sector better informed on the 
overall goals, it did not result in a more coherent plan. Significantly, the segment 
committees focused on identifying specific problems and recommending solutions 
to them, resulting in a Sector report that made concrete proposals on relatively 
narrow policy questions. 
If consensus sometimes proved elusive at the segment and sector levels, the 
concept of strategic planning must have been entirely foreign. There seemed little 
possibility that the unaided voluntary committees could achieve their overriding 
goal. This necessitated a counter-initiative, running from the top down. Perhaps it 
was only at the Executive Committee and the staff levels that the full ramifications 
of the planning process were understood. Defining an economic strategy meant 
facing hard choices: extending support to potential growth sectors and withholding 
or withdrawing it from declining ones. As the 1965 interim report later declared, 
"planning must encourage the ultimate termination of economic activities which 
are obsolete or not competitive"."» 
As these currents swirled privately within the VEP organization, its public 
profile was restrained, but positive, during the opening years. The Truro meetings 
were duly reported in the press, while Ike Smith and Russell Harrington exhorted 
audiences throughout the province. Editorial comment remained optimistic and 
open minded, reflecting support for action on growth and employment problems, 
and for the effort to reach out to private interests as partners.42 One of the few 
critical voices raised during this time was that of David Lewis, the deputy leader of 
the federal New Democratic Party. Lewis dismissed the proliferation of consultative 
bodies as "cocktail planning", in which "a lot of busy executives of labour and 
industry are to be brought together from time to time to have an enjoyable meal 
and talk".43 As an alternative, he called for adoption of more genuine concerted 
action, based on the French Commissariat of Planning approach. 
Such doubts had little impact, however, on an organization which was still 
enthusiastically filling out its mandate. If the "bottom-up" sectoral thrust was 
inherently fragmentary, a more disciplined centralism would necessarily follow 
from the search for the comprehensive economic plan. In this, the executive 
initiative lay with the senior appointees and technical officials. Once the VEP 
41 Voluntary Economic Planning Board, Report on Progress (Halifax, 1965), p. 6. 
42 For editorial comment in the Halifax Chronicle-Herald, see "Well Qualified", 3 May 1962; 
"A Good Start", 4 September 1962; "Another Smith", 25 September 1962; "Vital Task", 22 
November 1962; "New Spirit", 1 January 1963; "First Glimpse", 3 March 1965; and "More 
Interest", 17 September 1965. 
43 '"Cocktail Planning' Rapped", The Chronicle-Herald, 22 January 1963, p. 1. 
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Board and staff were in place in 1964, attention swung directly to the planning 
process. The four functioning sectors were asked to begin drafting their sector plans, 
and VEP staff were assigned responsibility for drafting versions for the 
still-unorganized sectors. While there was inevitably room for variation in the 
content of sector plans, a basic format was clearly stipulated: 
Each plan should contain at least the following: (1) The annual target 
expressed in a percentage of annual growth; (2) A sort of historical review 
of the sector or segment in the past, considering the statistics and trends 
which have been characteristic; (3) The recent and current rate of growth; 
(4) The potential for increased growth, both in the field of productivity and 
in the field of markets, including population increase and changes in 
consumption; (5) The obstacles which in the past and in the present have 
prevented, and are preventing us from attaining a faster rate of growth; (6) 
The obstacles which we will probably encounter in the future; (7) The 
policies which should be followed, both by the industry and by 
government, in order to help reach the target; (8) Conclusions.44 
The Board approved a work schedule that would see the draft plan consolidated by 
the end of 1964. It could then be presented to the Government before the Legislative 
session in February 1965, offering an opportunity to gauge political response. 
Professor W.Y. Smith drafted a staff paper during the summer of 1964, attempting 
to set out the key policy issues. Although it attracted its share of criticism from 
VEP activists, it prefigured both the interim and the Final plans to a striking 
degree.45 
Smith argued that the primary sectors could be expected to shed labour as they 
restructured, though this could result in higher real income levels. The major 
increase in employment would have to come from secondary manufacturing, where 
"Nova Scotia must develop a whole new group of growth industries"; During the 
period of the first plan, at least, little employment stimulus could be expected from 
the service sector either. Consequently, Smith advanced a growth pole strategy 
based on threshold urban areas, for which capital assistance and tax expenditures 
should be targeted. In doing so, he rejected both of the major existing federal 
programmes: the infrastructure expenditure approach (embraced by the Atlantic 
Development Board since 1963) and the Area Development Administration's 
"designated area" approach (which offered fiscal incentives for new manufacturing 
investment in rural areas with high unemployment).46 Smith closed with the 
prescient comment that, "in the future, VEP must obtain the close co-operation of 
... federally sponsored agencies if it is to carry out its responsibilities in a thorough 
44 "Hon. G.I. Smith", Ibid., pp. 6-7. 
45 "Confidential: A Strategy for Economic Development in Nova Scotia", July 1965, MacNeil 
Papers, pp. 1696-1721, StFXUA. 
46 For details on these programs, see James P. Bickerton, Nova Scotia, Ottawa and the Politics 
of Regional Development (Toronto, 1990), Chapter 6. 
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and competent manner". 
Dr. Smith may have spelled out the logic of planning, and extrapolated its 
likely outcomes, more concretely than most volunteers had yet heard. In any case 
his Strategy Paper spoke a very different language as compared to the discrete 
policy measures percolating up from various segment committees. The clash of 
top-down and bottom-up politics led to inevitable tensions. During one review of 
the Strategy Paper by the Executive Committee of the Board, "emphasis was 
placed on the necessity for the professional staff to guard against usurping the 
sector committee's roles when rewriting the strategy paper, especially in sectors 
where reports to the Board have yet to occur".47 But even in activist sectors, the 
initial draft plans came in for revision by both Board and staff.48 The initial drafts 
of the Power Sector plan were judged to be weak, and oriented "inward to the 
industry".49 As well, the "rising" and "declining" segments of the forest sector were 
at an impasse over the thrust of that plan, which the Board sent back for further 
consideration. Ultimately, the partially compiled document was submitted to the 
Government as a Report on Progress, and was released to the public in February 
1965. In tabling the report, G.I. Smith spoke positively as he expounded on the 
VEP exercise, and, without committing his Government to any particular 
proposals, he looked toward the implementation phase, declaring that: "it is easy 
to talk big and act small. But if we are going to make any progress, our action has 
to be as big as our talk".5o 
The Board weighed a number of macro-economic targets before settling on 
higher per capita income, higher employment levels and improved productivity as 
the key planning objectives. Underlying this choice was a sober appreciation of 
Nova Scotia's comparatively poor economic performance: 
Considerable effort will be needed in all economic sectors simply to 
maintain the present margin of income disparity [$385 per capita] between 
Nova Scotia and Canada. Its reduction will require an even greater and 
more concerted drive which could only be successful in the long term, si 
For the Progress Report, the Board emphasized the employment target as the 
overriding priority. Over the four years of the First Plan, the target was 3000-4000 
new jobs per year. Given that employment growth since 1950 had averaged only 
47 Executive Committee Meeting, Minutes, 6 January 1965, MacNeil Papers, p. 1846, StFXUA. 
48 See, for example, the untitled staff memorandum circulated late in 1964, raising "a short list 
of sample questions to be asked in assessing each program or project proposed for inclusion in 
the Forest Economic Development Plan for Nova Scotia", MacNeil Papers, p. 1807, StFXUA. 
49 Voluntary Economic Planning Board, Minutes, 14-15 December 1964, MacNeil Papers, p. 
1816, StFXUA. 
50 Statement by G.I. Smith, Press Release, MacNeil Papers, p. 1885, StFXUA. 
51 Voluntary Planning Board, Report on Progress. Overall Plan. Nova Scotia to 1968, February 
1965, p. 77. 
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1800 new jobs per year, this constituted a bold, even rash, objective.52 Equally 
revealing was the sectoral breakdown in employment prospects. Since the primary 
sector was expected to shed labour in favour of capital goods, any employment 
gains would have to come in the manufacturing and service sectors. For 
manufacturing, this meant reliance on new enterprise creation. Beyond that, the 
service sector, which had generated most of the new positions in the 1951-61 
period, would be heavily taxed again. 
The Progress Report raised a number of intriguing planning issues. In pointing 
toward the pivotal role of service (especially public service) sector employment, it 
underlined the critical role of the federal payroll in Nova Scotia. Combining 
civilian and military positions, the Department of Defence employed just over 11 
per cent of the provincial labour force in 1961.53 With the uncertainties associated 
with Canada's defence policy in the 1960s, this remained a pivotal provincial 
concern. In another vein, the Report confronted the consequences of the "structural 
adjustments", which it both predicted and sought to shape. Resource production 
would become more efficient even as jobs were lost. Manufacturing employment 
would concentrate increasingly in growth centres, while rural and remote 
communities "will, in the long run, fail to provide for their population and the 
costs of services in these communities will be prohibitively high".54 
The Progress Report was submitted to the Government in January 1965, just 
over two years after the Agriculture Sector had kicked off the entire process. During 
this time, the work of the sectors had been quite uneven. Furthest advanced were the 
primary resource sectors, which had all submitted initial reports (with 
recommendations) to the Board. Three further sectors (Manufacturing, Mining and 
Construction) were following a slower track. Each was in the process of 
formulating an initial report. The final three sectors had barely begun to form. 
Tourism was only holding its segment meetings as the Report appeared. 
Transportation and Communications, and Services had yet to be organized at all. 
(The latter was never established.) These imbalances meant that so far as 
"bottom-up" input was concerned, the overall strategy would be much more fully 
informed by resource industry concerns than by those of the service sector or 
manufacturing. In light of the employment strategy articulated by the Board, this 
constituted a discrepancy of major proportions. 
Exactly one year elapsed between the release of the Report on Progress and the 
First Plan. During this time, the Secondary Manufacturing Sector attracted the 
greatest attention, particularly since it was expected to carry the greatest weight in 
employment creation. The Board launched several new initiatives during the spring 
of 1965. It created a Special Committee on Steel, to work together with officials 
52 The target figure combined an estimate of new jobs necessary to absorb natural increases in 
labour market size with an estimate of jobs required to halve the past unemployment rate (of 
6-10%), while also meeting the new unemployment expected from labour displacement in 
modernized operations. 
53 Atlantic Provinces Economic Council, Defence Expenditures and the Economy of the Atlantic 
Provinces (Fredericton, 1965), p. 11. 
54 Report on Progress, p. 84. 
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from Ottawa and from the Dominion Steel and Coal Company (DOSCO) in 
assessing the prospects for heavy industry in the Sydney area. This Joint 
Committee on Steel sponsored a major two and one-half year study on potential 
market diversification for DOSCO. 
In the meantime, the Manufacturing Sector remained active (chaired by G.C. 
McDade of Minas Basin Pulp and Power), while the Board also appointed a new 
Special Committee on Manufacturing to accelerate thinking on the sector plan. 
This was a matter which evidently lay beyond the reach of the Sector 
representatives, but was nonetheless deemed critical to the success of the overall 
plan. Consequently, the Special Committee sought expertise where it could be 
found, with state agencies such as the Department of Trade and Industry, Industrial 
Estates Ltd. and the CNR Industrial Development Division. Out of this grew 
several more specialized consultant studies, on such topics as locational incentive 
programmes, and growth centres. When the time came to formulate the final sector 
plan, the job was delegated to a VEP staff committee led by Ian Logan and George 
Miller. They drew together the accumulated reports and decisions into a final 
version. Its authorship was so personalized that it was formally acknowledged in 
the printed report. Clearly, this case illustrates a serious discrepancy between the 
task and the capacities of the sector personnel. It was solved in a revealing way, by 
calling in the state administrators to frame a set of proposals for their own 
programmes. In addition, considerable staff energy was devoted to framing a new 
"policy directed toward accelerated growth of manufacturing in Nova Scotia". All 
of these efforts were echoed in the comprehensive planning document, though work 
continued well past this date. 
The First Plan for Economic Development to 1968 was conveyed to Finance 
Minister Smith on 11 February 1966, and was tabled in the Legislature three weeks 
later. Harrington left no doubt about the next steps, declaring that "The Board 
respectfully requests the concurrence of the Government with the programmes, 
recommended in the Plan, and requests that it give immediate attention to their 
implementation as outlined".55 Thirteen major recommendations were summarized 
in the Preface, with others interspersed through the 91 pages of text. Since 
employment and income gains were expected to come chiefly from expanded 
secondary industry, the first thrust endorsed an urban growth-pole strategy for 
cornerstone industries, and the coordination of ADB, IEL and other provincial 
incentive programmes. A further cluster of recommendations urged Nova Scotia to 
pursue changes to federal monetary, defence and commercial policies, while the 
final set called for formal Cabinet and departmental responses to the Plan. 
In many ways, the First Plan reflected the contradictions between top-down and 
bottom-up agendas which had become so obvious within the organization. Gone 
were the detailed sector appraisals of 1965, relegated (ostensibly on grounds of 
length) to separate covers. It became more difficult to discern the input of the 
voluntary committees, as distinct from staff overviews. Equally revealing were four 
55 "Letter of Transmittal", in Voluntary Planning Board, First Plan for Economic Development 
to 1968 (Halifax, 1966). 
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appendices identifying work in progress which could not readily be incorporated 
into the "final" plan. Substantively, the Plan added little to the Progress Report. 
Instead of action plans, it read more like a consultant's overview, offering sweeping 
observations on policy processes and aggregate targets, but little on measures for 
their realization. Tellingly, the Plan conceded that "in time, the process of planning 
should become more precise, and the plan itself should possess increasing degrees 
of sophistication". 56 The Board seemed content to locate itself on a learning curve 
as it looked toward the second (1968-1972) planning period. 
The unfinished quality of the First Plan, and delays in the release of the more 
specific sector plans, postponed the formal response by the Nova Scotia 
Government and obscured the message when it came. Eventually the Premier met 
the Board, indicating that the document fell well short of comprehensive planning 
as initially envisaged.57 Outright rejection, however, was slow and indirect. As 
negative responses mounted in the civil service, the Board quietly withdrew its 
recommendations as actionable proposals. By the summer of 1969, Voluntary 
Economic Planning was completely becalmed. 
More immediately, outside observers were dissatisfied as well. One commentary 
from the Economics Department at Dalhousie University dismissed the First Plan 
as a "muddled documenf'.ss This critique, by Professor Paul Huber, raised a series 
of technical objections: the stress on manufacturing ignored the more important role 
of service sector employment; the overall targets were inconsistent; and project 
evaluation was shallow as well as biased by special interests.59 Over time, the 
institutional limitations of the VEP process were recognized and delineated. 
Anthony Careless observed that: 
without any objectives or constraints, and without a secretariat of well 
informed economists who could have discreetly directed matters — 
although not seeming to — the sector studies and plan became an 
undisciplined collection of private sector desiderata, of individual targets 
arranged by businessmen without a framework or process by which they 
could be achieved. 60 
While undoubtedly accurate, this fails to convey the complicated political and 
economic setting in which the planning impulse foundered. One crucial ingredient 
was the coal and steel crisis, which threatened the province's leading heavy 
industry complex with collapse. Another was the problem of reconciling the Plan 
with the political and bureaucratic interests of the provincial state. A third was the 
increasingly complicated array of federal economic programmes. All three factors 
56 Voluntary Planning Board, First Plan (Halifax, 1966), p. 21. 
57 Lamport, Common Ground, p. 46. 
58 Lamport, Common Ground, p. 47. 
59 Huber's unpublished study is cited in T.N. Brewis, Regional Economic Policies in Canada 
(Toronto, 1979), p. 208. 
60 Anthony Careless, Initiative and Response (Montreal, 1977), p. 119. 
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posed trenchant challenges to the integrity of the planning process, and as such 
offerred telling measures of its potential as an instrument of strong state 
performance. 
Virtually from its outset in 1956, the Stanfield government was forced to 
grapple with the problems of a declining coal (and later steel) industry. This was a 
dilemma of major proportions, since DOSCO's Sydney works formed the largest 
industrial complex in the province. Like his predecessors, Stanfield waged constant 
battles with Ottawa seeking to augment the federal subventions for the production, 
transport and consumption (for electricity generation) of coal.6i By 1957 this 
accumulated support for Nova Scotia coal exceeded $20 million. Despite the 
Diefenbaker government's willingness to offer incremental increases in the face of 
mine closures, coal's long run prospects were, by 1960, poor: the central Canadian 
demand for eastern coal had slumped sharply in the face of cheap U.S. imports and 
Alberta natural gas, and DOSCO had been acquired by the British firm Hawker 
Siddeley, which was casting a critical eye over its Nova Scotia empire. 
For all of these reasons, the Sydney heavy industries represented a huge 
challenge to and test of the voluntary planning process. While VEP had been 
formed to chart a growth strategy, Sydney was facing contraction and decline. It 
remained to be determined whether the DOSCO complex should be treated as a 
potential growth pole, a stable platform or a fading enclave. In the early years, 
opinions differed sharply on this question. Nor was it clear how the planning 
process would grapple, intellectually and organizationally, with DOSCO. 
Conventional analyses tended to follow the official statistical reporting categories, 
with the result that DOSCO registered not as a unified enterprise but as a set of 
disaggregated outputs in coal, iron and steel, electricity generation, rolling stock 
manufacture, etc. This was reinforced by the sectoral logic of VEP, which left the 
Power, Mining and Secondary Manufacturing committees each grasping a part of 
the puzzle. This was not unreasonable for a planning process which stressed the 
need for volunteer contributions from the ground up. However, it avoided entirely 
the importance of the enterprise, as opposed to the plant, as the key planning unit. 
Moreover, the uneven advance of the sector groupings ensured that coal and steel 
issues would be addressed in a piecemeal fashion. As one of the earliest sectors, 
Power naturally turned its attention to coal matters, well before the Mining sector 
was able to contribute. Eventually the Board stepped in to transfer jurisdiction 
formally to a hastily convened coal segment group within the Mining sector. Once 
the Manufacturing sector was launched, iron and steel matters were explored in 
virtual isolation from the coal question. As a partial counterweight, DOSCO's 
executive vice-president, J.E. Clubb, had been recruited to the VEP Board, 
acknowledging the company's status as the province's largest industrial employer. 
Yet, following the 1965 interim report, VEP took a more prominent role in 
dealing with coal and steel. Both were lifted out of the sector domain, and vested 
in special committees of the Board. A major study of steel markets and expansion 
61 For an account of these issues, see Margaret Conrad, George Nowlan (Toronto, 1986), chap. 
13. 
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prospects was designed in concert with several federal agencies and DOSCO. Early 
in this process, company President C.H. Drury outlined the relationships between 
the primary steel mills at Sydney, DOSCO's new rolling mills at Contracoeur 
(Quebec), and the new complex being built by the Quebec state company, Sidbec. 
Drury stated clearly that if Sidbec could undercut the Sydney plant in delivering 
primary steel to Contracoeur after 1970, then Sydney would close.62 Perhaps 
understandably, senior Board members kept this disclosure under close wraps. The 
steel study, released in 1967, endorsed modernization, provided that it focus on 
current levels of production, rather than expansion or diversification. But, in so 
doing, it assumed that the captive market at Contracoeur was firm until 1970.63 
Somewhat expediently, it was left to the Second Plan to tackle the issue further.64 
Needless to say, VEP was caught completely unprepared by DOSCO's closure 
announcement on 13 October 1967. Just two days earlier the Board had been 
reviewing its Sydney Steel Study with no particular sense of urgency.es 
The ensuing political crisis was sufficiently severe to derail the entire VEP 
process. The provincial Cabinet was preoccupied with the closure issue for the better 
part of a year, as it struggled to salvage the steel facility under state ownership. 
The political, technical and financial demands of this campaign left few surplus 
resources. Furthermore, the planning process had suffered a near fatal blow. Far 
from anticipating such a calamity, VEP was left entirely ignorant, despite its 
ostensible consulting network (including DOSCO officials). The entire planning 
framework was in danger of being conceptually and practically discredited, little 
more than a year after the release of the First Plan. In fact, VEP never recovered a 
significant role in the field of steel policy, as both provincial government and 
Sydney Steel Company (SYSCO) officials assumed the lead. VEP's Special 
Committee on Steel continued to meet, hoping to translate its accumulated 
expertise into an advisory role, but to little effect. 
Another test of state strength occurred when the First Plan was transmitted from 
the VEP Board to the provincial cabinet and bureaucracy. This issue of 
implementation moved to the forefront as soon as the Plan had been released to the 
public. In many respects it was a spectre which had hung over the planning process 
from the outset. Although VEP functioned at the behest of the provincial 
government, it had operated largely apart from it. On one level, the relationship 
had always been positive during the preparatory period, particularly since the prime 
contacts flowed from the official reporting relationships. The Premier routinely 
attended sector organizing meetings, Finance Minister Smith had spoken 
generously in the Legislature on the occasions of the tabling of the Progress and 
First Reports, and Deputy-Minister Goodfellow was intimately involved through 
62 Roger Mills to VEP Executive Committee members, 14 April 1965, MacNeil Papers, p. 1907, 
StFXUA. 
63 Sydney Steelmaking Study (Halifax, 1968). 
64 "Staff Paper on Second Plan", n.d. but likely December 1966. MacNeil Papers, p. 2368, 
StFXUA. 
65 Resolution of the Board, 11 October 1967, MacNeil Papers, p. 2507, StFXUA. 
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his presence on the Board and Executive Committee. In addition, the VEP staff 
functioned as a section of Smith's Department of Finance and Economics. Yet, in 
the wider context, interaction with the Cabinet and civil service was limited. The 
typical sequence saw the Board relay its decisions to the Finance Minister, who 
directed them to the affected government agencies. The fragility of this special 
relationship concerned several senior Board members. During the summer of 1965, 
G.I. Smith hosted a number of luncheons to encourage rapport between Board 
members and a wider array of government officials. 
After the First Plan, the growing volume and weight of VEP proposals 
threatened to overwhelm the original arrangement. To improve liaison with the 
Cabinet, a Joint Committee was struck in March 1966, bringing together three 
Ministers and the VEP Executive Committee. This group met at least five times 
over the next 18 months, and provided a channel of contact and feedback. There 
were growing signs of distance between government and VEP personnel. At one 
meeting G.I. Smith chided the Board, complaining that a recent recommendation 
"had not been taken in the usual thorough manner, and...had been directed to the 
government without the benefit of the usual staff assessment"^ 
More important, the Committee requested that all deputy ministers assess the 
ramifications which the Plan held for their programmes, first in the spring of 1966 
and again the following winter. Almost two years later, a staff study assessing 
progress toward implementation drew rather pessimistic conclusions. It found that 
"while many recommendations have received 'exploratory attention', relatively few 
have been acutely pursued. It seems that a considerable length of time must elapse 
before actual implementation of positive decisions can take place".67 The problem 
was one of commanding attention under conditions of administrative scarcity, for 
"when a V.E.P. project comes along unexpectedly, department heads are 
understandably reluctant to sacrifice their own projects in favour of those 
emanating from Voluntary Economic Planning". This situation was a source of 
serious concern, since volunteer committee members were impatient for action on 
their recommendations, and "a disquieting measure of cynicism toward the whole 
program is becoming evidenf'.es 
The Government of Nova Scotia responded by taking control of the planning 
process at the Cabinet level. In July 1968 the new Premier, G.I. Smith, established 
a five person Cabinet Committee on Policy and Programs. It would be supported 
by a Secretariat drawing together the planning chiefs from four agencies including 
Roger Mills of VEP.69 Publicly, the new Cabinet machinery was welcomed as a 
66 Executive Committee, Minutes, 25 July 1967, MacNeil Papers, p. 2461, StFXUA. 
67 "Implementation of Voluntary Economic Planning Recommendations", 31 May 1968, 
MacNeil Papers, p. 2811, StFXUA. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Government of Nova Scotia, Press Release, 22 July 1968, MacNeil Papers, p. 2850, StFXUA. 
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means of restoring momentum. Harrington allowed in October 1968 that the Board 
had done no work for six months!70 Yet, as this new structure became operational, 
the original VEP mandate was rendered increasingly precarious, even untenable. 
The planning chiefs met with the VEP Board in October, to outline the changes and 
serve notice that their joint offices would be advising the Cabinet Committee on the 
question of future economic plans. 71 Politely but firmly, VEP was being consigned 
to the margins. While the VEP Board bravely announced that a Second Plan 
would be brought down in 1969, it now lacked both the internal resources and the 
external support to deliver on such a goal. 
Throughout the history of consultative planning in Nova Scotia, the federal 
authority was a formative influence. Though Ottawa played no direct role in VEP 
circles, the federal fiscal capacity, combined with its expanding mandate for action 
in low growth regions, ensured that it loomed large in any strategic initiative. Yet 
the VEP apparatus lacked both the authority and the mechanism to harmonize its 
efforts with Ottawa. During the early years this was obscured by professions of 
good intention. But in 1968, the Government of Nova Scotia began to move from 
an ad hoc to a more strategic approach in its relationship with Ottawa. Since this 
was achieved principally at the Cabinet and bureaucratic levels, VEP's policy 
domain was reduced once again. 
As early as 1963, VEP activists had been aware of the federal presence at the 
margin. At its inaugural meeting, the Board requested a briefing on the plethora of 
federal agencies which claimed a place in Atlantic economic development. Yet the 
Board discovered that even the roster of specialist agencies understated the 
magnitude of the federal presence, as it failed to account for Ottawa's substantial 
coal and transportation subsidies, infrastructural investments in harbours and 
airports, and considerable network of military bases, to name only a few. Not 
surprisingly, the early VEP staff papers stressed Ottawa's critical strategic 
importance. If ignored, it could undo Nova Scotia's best efforts; if harnessed it 
could magnify positive outcomes many times over. This appreciation was quite 
acute, as evidenced by a call for the study of the federal Government's regional 
fiscal and monetary policies, for long-term expenditure commitments by the 
Department of National Defence, and for a rigorous review of the respective roles of 
social infrastructure and direct subventions to business as investment levers.72 
These concerns were certainly not misplaced, particularly as Ottawa expanded 
its economic presence in Atlantic Canada from 1962. After the Agricultural and 
Rural Development (ARDA) programme was modified to include non-farm rural 
rehabilitation, a variety of projects were funded in Nova Scotia to consolidate 
micro-landholdings and organize small producers. In 1965 an ARDA Task Force 
was struck to formulate an integrated plan for eastern Nova Scotia. Although VEP 
70 "Planning Board 'Fed Up"', The Chronicle-Herald, 4 October 1968, p. 1. 
71 "Outline of a Presentation to the Voluntary Planning Board", 3 October 1968, MacNeil 
Papers, p. 2873, StFXUA. 
72 W.Y. Smith, "A Strategy for Economic Development in Nova Scotia", n.d., MacNeil Papers, 
pp. 1696-1721, StFXUA. 
Voluntary Economic Planning 25 
participated in the project design, it was also willing to voice criticism of ARDA's 
unilateralist tendencies.73 On another front, the Area Development Administration 
(ADA) in the federal Department of Industry offered capital investment incentives to 
designated areas of high unemployment, which, in the case of Nova Scotia, took in 
virtually the entire province outside of Halifax-Dartmouth. Here it was the logic of 
locational preference which troubled VEP. Since Ottawa aimed at combatting rural 
decline, it chose to view the urban centres as economically self-sustaining. 
However, to VEP officials (as well as those at APEC), this contradicted the 
preferred growth pole approach to concentrating new manufacturing enterprise at a 
limited number of superior sites for maximum linkage.74 
Neither did infrastructural investment escape. The Diefenbaker Government's 
concept of an Atlantic Development Board (ADB) as a federal planning council 
was transformed in 1963 by the Pearson Liberals into a spending agent for 
transport, utility and industrial park infrastructure. In this, the ADB's initial 
capital base ($100 million) far exceeded that of the major provincial instrument, 
Industrial Estates Ltd. Indeed, the ADB was impressive even by federal standards. 
During its peak years (1965-1969) the ADB outspent the combined budgets of its 
federal cousins in ARDA, ADA and FRED. 75 To Voluntary Planning this offered a 
timely opportunity: it called for the ADB to establish a Halifax-Dartmouth fund, 
shifting from social infrastructure to capital assistance in the neglected urban 
growth pole. 
While these cases were identified as the most problematic obstacles to VEP 
operations, the backwash from federal economic policies could touch virtually any 
provincial agency. The evolution of Industrial Estates Ltd. offers a case in point. 
By design, IEL was expected to purchase land and develop "estates" of serviced 
properties and buildings which could be rented to corporate tenants. The publicly 
funded incentive would take the form of favourable lease-back financing which 
would lessen a project's capital costs to the business owners (the tenants). However, 
IEL was forced to alter its entire approach in the 1964-1966 period, becoming a 
more conventional public lending agency. This was in response to federal budget 
measures which made lease-back arrangements far less favourable to firms, together 
with new eligibility criteria for the ADA grants which required applicants to co-own 
their productive assets.76 
The cascading burdens of coal and steel decline led to a new federal initiative 
after mid-decade in the form of the Cape Breton Development Corporation 
(DEVCO). Responding to the recommendations of the Donald Report, Ottawa 
73 Voluntary Economic Planning Board, Minutes, 5 March 1965. A letter was sent to the ARDA 
Regional Director pointing out "the embarassment which it and other federal agencies are 
causing by moving in on projects in the province without prior consultation with appropriate 
provincial bodies". MacNeil Papers, p. 1892, StFXUA. 
74 W.Y. Smith, "Strategy" and "M.P.'s Divided on APEC Aid Plan", The Chronicle-Herald, 9 
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75 Bickerton, Nova Scotia, Ottawa and the Politics of Regional Development, p. 180. 
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agreed to assume ownership of the Sydney coal fields, and to establish a state 
corporation to promote industrial diversification on Cape Breton Islands It was 
the VEP Board's strong recommendation (successful in this case) that the two 
functions not be separated but rather be combined in a single crown corporation. 
This was to permit maximum co-ordination between the phase-out of unprofitable 
coal mines (with its attendant unemployment) and the attraction of new enterprise 
and jobs. 
Thus it can be seen that, by 1967, the Voluntary Economic Planning activists 
could harbour legitimate concern that their efforts at consultative planning might be 
swamped by an apparently inexhaustible wave of specialized federal instruments. 
Where VEP was struggling to reconcile industry group concerns with broad macro-
economic targets, to fashion a plan with sufficient moral authority to overcome its 
strictly advisory status, a panoply of federal agencies had been set loose to 
dispense major budgets for highly specific purposes. Such discrepancies did not 
pass unnoticed. In its First Annual Review, the Atlantic Provinces Economic 
Council cited the "conceptual inconsistency between VEP and ADB", and called for 
the fashioning of a common approach which leaned more strongly on the Voluntary 
Planning traditions However naive it might have been, VEP certainly had its own 
vision of coordinated planning: demand driven federal programmes should be 
subordinated to provincial planning goals; expenditures should be co-ordinated in a 
"trinity plan" of all three jurisdictions; secondary manufacturing incentives should 
be restricted to urban growth poles, while smaller centres should be treated as 
resource industry or public service enclaves.79 However, it is a measure of the 
limitations of the VEP process that, despite such recognition, these problems were 
never adequately confronted, much less resolved, at the provincial level. 
Ironically, it was in Ottawa rather than Halifax that a strategic review of 
regional economic policy was pushed through. From a coterie of semi-autonomous 
agencies and offices attached to different departments and ministers, the Trudeau 
government fashioned in 1968-69 a more cohesive bureaucracy for Regional 
Economic Expansion. At its core was the industrial incentive grant programme 
(finally broadened to acknowledge urban growth poles championed by VEP). Both 
the ADB and FRED were phased out, while rural ARDA and Cape Breton's 
DEVCO survived intact. The breadth of these programme changes provoked 
considerable anxiety in Nova Scotia. But by the time the design had emerged in the 
spring of 1969, VEP was no longer in a position even to intervene. It was Nova 
Scotia's Cabinet-based machinery for policy coordination which was beefed up to 
deal with DREE. Ironically, less than four years later, Ottawa rediscovered the 
virtues of sector level planning. Under the subsequent system of federal-provincial 
77 For a fuller appraisal of DEVCO, see Roy E. George, "The Cape Breton Development 
Corporation", in Allan Tupper and G. Bruce Doern, eds., Public Corporations and Public 
Policy in Canada (Montreal, 1981), pp. 365-88. 
78 Atlantic Provinces Economic Council, First Annual Review (1967), p. 66. 
79 On the trinity notion see "Harrington Calls for 'Trinity Plan'", The Chronicle-Herald, 20 
October 1966, p. 24. 
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General Development Agreements, the key implementation mechanisms were 
"sub-agreements" targeting particular industries (e.g. steel, mining, pulp and 
paper). However, this was achieved strictly on an inter-governmental basis, and the 
lack of direct business input was one of the notable features of the GDA system. 
Ever since the submission of the First Plan, VEP had waited for a state response 
that never came. In effect, the political agenda was overwhelmed after 1966, by 
new and urgent issues. On the one hand was the threatened closure of the DOSCO 
plants, while on the other lay Ottawa's new regional development initiative. As a 
result, more than three years passed before the Province replied publicly. This took 
the form of Nova Scotia's Development Plan of 1970. Perhaps reflecting the advent 
of new programme budget techniques of expenditure management, this document 
had little to say about grand new initiatives. Instead, it focussed on current 
programmes, which were simply re-packaged under broad functional objectives. In 
the aftermath of the DOSCO crisis, and the massive financial commitments which 
the steel nationalization imposed on the Province, the prospect for major new 
spending measures seemed slim. All that was left was to put the best face on 
existing programmes. Accordingly, the 1970 Plan promised to "strengthen the 
development impact of departmental action".so 
For VEP, the writing was clearly on the wall. The Province had increasingly 
ignored its planning efforts, judging them an irrelevant distraction. Instead the 
government went public with an artful re-packaging of its existing commitments in 
an effort to extract coherent intentions from an accidental whole. The Voluntary 
Planning Board had already struck a Special Committee to begin work on the 
Second Plan. However, this was quietly cancelled at the Premier's direction in mid-
1969. Instead the committee was urgently reassigned to review the organization's 
very future. It concluded that "the original concept of VEP being a planning body 
to the extent outlined in the Act is no longer applicable". Instead, it proposed that 
the organization be retained as a forum for discussion by business, labour and 
government. In particular, it could serve "to involve the private sector in the 
analysis of government planning proposals during the process of their development, 
and prior to final approval".8i Thus the demise of comprehensive planning was 
complete. Voluntary Planning would be transformed into a permanent consultative 
infrastructure for business input into provincial policy, within the privileged 
confines of the appointed network. From the ruins of its flawed experiment in 
concertation, the Provincial Government acquired the rudiments of a formal 
representational network which has proven to be remarkably persistent. 
This article opened by posing questions about the causes, the substance and the 
implications of the Stanfield/Smith Government's experiment in concerted 
economic planning. Prior to the launch of VEP, there was neither a tradition nor 
evident potential for consultative policy-making in Nova Scotia. Instead it was a 
product of the Stanfield manifesto to reverse the province's relative post-war 
economic decline. The solution had to be structural and comprehensive, and this 
80 Nova Scotia, Development Plan (March, 1970), p. 11. 
81 "Report of the Special Committee of the Voluntary Planning Board", 27 October 1970, p. 6. 
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was not feasible without the participation and consent of the most closely affected 
interests. Stanfield's solutions were bold and imaginative by the political standards 
of the time, and VEP was one of several designs to enhance the capabilities of a 
modest and traditional provincial state, while at the same time building social 
understanding for potentially disruptive change. 
The concerted planning system was inspired by the French experience in post-
War industrial planning, though this was extensively adjusted for domestic 
application. Of its various elements, the representational structure was modelled 
most closely on France. Segment and sector committees offered platforms for 
deliberation between business and government officials, with the results channelled 
upwards to the Board level for harmonization in the master plan. VEP contrasted 
most strongly with the French system on matters of planning powers, decision-
making processes and position within the overall state structure. Entirely absent 
were statutory powers, fiscal levers, or material incentives which would enable VEP 
to spark action or drive compliance. Ultimately the Plan was little more than a 
passive list of indicative targets. Neither did the planning mechanism have firm 
roots in the wider civil service network which could impart thrust to the Plan. As a 
result, Voluntary Economic Planning was long on mobilizing private input but 
short on translating it into results. The slogan "business, labour, government" was 
a misnomer inasmuch as the latter two were never integral partners. 
Consequently, the strongest elements of the French planning system were not 
carried over to Nova Scotia. It is true that VEP attempted to introduce the 
middle-term planning horizon, the definition of aggregate economic targets and the 
sectoral formulation of more detailed plans. However, it was fatally burdened with 
the voluntary ethic, which required that all vestiges of coercion, so vital to the 
French plan, be rejected. While the VEP Secretariat was located within the 
provincial Department of Finance and Economics, this did not translate into 
extraordinary administrative leverage. The planning staff was technically 
under-equipped, and operated in isolation from the annual budget cycle, a potent 
planning instrument for the provincial state. Despite the moral support of G.I. 
Smith, first as Finance Minister and later as Premier, the organization remained an 
"outside force" to the state. 
By contrast, the French Commissariat du Plan was attached to the head of the 
government, the president of the Council of Ministers. While not a spending agency 
itself, it exercised significant leverage with the Treasury Division in the Ministry of 
Finance (controlling expenditures); over the plans for nationalized industries; over a 
separate fund for "planning projects"; and over the dispensing of credit to strategic 
sectors and enterprises. Indeed, in 1962, the Finance Ministry announced that all 
departmental claims on budget funds would henceforth be judged by the priorities 
ofthe.PIan. 
The VEP Secretariat bore little resemblance to the Commissariat. The Nova 
Scotia legislation stressed that VEP would play a consultative role only. Not only 
did it lack any project funding, but its links into the provincial government 
remained underspecified. The Act said nothing about how the VEP Plans would be 
translated into action. In fact, two former consultants have since observed that the 
absence of senior politicians at its head was the crucial failing of VEP as an 
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organization.82 In retrospect, at least three sets of relationships were crucial. One 
was the connection between the VEP Board and the Cabinet. Another related to the 
fiscal planners within the Finance Department, who controlled the budget. A third 
related to the business programmes in the Department of Trade and Industry and 
Industrial Estates Ltd. 
There was, of course, a further level of constraints embedded in the federal 
structure. The divided jurisdiction deprived the province of the tax and credit levers 
which the central French state found to be essential. In Canada, it was federal 
agencies which dispensed public credit to business through the Industrial 
Development Bank, the Farm Credit Corporation, the Export Credit Insurance 
Corporation and the Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation. Moreover, Nova 
Scotia made little headway with its arguments that Ottawa ought to develop a 
regionally discriminating fiscal and monetary policy. Most critically, the major 
development programmes which Ottawa prepared for economically depressed 
regions (which initially included all of Nova Scotia) were not factored into either 
the Interim or the final First Plan. Thus VEP proved impotent in moving Ottawa 
on issues which most concerned it, while Ottawa's main strategic initiatives went 
unacknowledged. Here VEP parted company with the bureaucracy. While the VEP 
plan was spinning toward oblivion, key elements in the Nova Scotia Departments 
of Finance, and Trade and Industry were hopping onto Ottawa's new bandwagon, 
an attractively funded mix of social infrastructure investment and growth pole 
location incentives.83 This is not to suggest that the Province fit easily into 
Ottawa's design. Indeed, the usual inter-jurisdictional tensions were exacerbated 
when Nova Scotia retained several former federal DREE officials to advise the 
Cabinet.84 Equally important, the Ottawa-initiated programmes were decidedly 
state-centred, indicating how completely producer interests had been pushed to the 
margin. 
If Voluntary Planning was unsuitable as an instrument to facilitate a stronger 
state form, it nevertheless proved to be an effective legitimating mechanism at the 
societal level. Public commentary and debate on the planning enterprise were 
consistently positive in tone, throughout the period to 1967. This is consistent with 
the almost naive populist expectation of the politicians, that business and labour 
elements could agree on a course of action and that state offices would absorb these 
priorities as a matter of course. The voluntary ethic seems oddly out of place, a 
lingering reflection of rural community values, in the context of modern business-
government planning. The reality was both more complicated and more mundane. 
Firmly ensconced interests could as easily block or delay the prospects for sectoral 
restructuring, to the extent that it threatened their immediate or intermediate 
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viability. Transformation was clearly what Robert Stanfield had in mind in 1962. 
Yet few sectoral reports displayed any strategic appreciation of the nature of growth 
or change. Instead, their recommendations read like petitions to remedy particular 
grievances. In the event, unaided committees of businessmen proved unable to 
transcend their immediate horizons. Perhaps it could not have been otherwise. There 
is no reason to expect that all sectors were equally viable candidates for planned 
growth. The French planners applied what became known as the 80/20 rule: "To 
make effective planning possible, the distribution of output in industry ought 
preferably to be such that something close to 80% of production comes from about 
20% of the firms". 85 By this standard only pulp and paper, coal mining, steel and 
power might have qualified in Nova Scotia. 
In the discussion of strong and weak state forms, VEP offers a revealing, if 
somewhat limited, perspective. Clearly there are several routes to a stronger state 
form. One involves insulating executive agencies from organized pressure, thereby 
increasing their operational autonomy. Another involves state agents negotiating a 
prior political consensus with leading interest blocs, in order to clear the way for 
future action. By intent, VEP falls obviously into the latter type. Regardless of the 
level of firm or group mobilization, however, a strong state also requires significant 
degrees of internal coordination and control. Again, an integrated economic plan 
offered a possible step in this direction. This expectation, however, was never 
realized. In fact, if the French planning regime is taken as an instance of a strong 
state in action, then Nova Scotia offers its antithesis. The VEP experience thus 
confirms a continuing weakness of the Nova Scotia state, both in its specific 
planning failures, and in the implication that societal groups' interests could be 
better accommodated by other means. For such a state, a pluralist network of 
advocacy groups would be far more functional. Indeed after its false start as a 
planning vehicle, this is exactly what VEP encouraged after 1970. Its legacy was a 
set of channels for routinized consultation, which left state authorities firmly in 
charge of policy determination. 
85 Andrew Shonfield, Modern Capitalism (New York, 1974), p. 138. 
